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Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: THE DUTY OF AN
EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE A SAFE PLACE TO
WORK FOR THE EMPLOYEE OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.

INTRODUCTION
In Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' the New Mexico Court of
Appeals was confronted for the first time with the issue of whether
an employer 2 has a duty to provide a safe place to work3 for the
1. 95 N.M. 501,623 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593,624 P.2d 535 (1981).
2. Although the opinion does not define the term "employer," it may be that this holding is
limited to those persons or businesses which employ direct workers of their own and carry compensation insurance for them. This inference is based on the reasoning in Fresquez v. Southwestern Indus. Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 89 N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976). See text accompanying note 69 infra. The court in
Fresquez stressed that it saw no reason for subjecting an employer to greater liability when an
independent contractor is hired in preference to using the employer's own workers, whose exclusive remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-6(D)
(Supp. 1980). Judge Hernandez, who was on the panel that heard Fresquez, also sat for Harmon. It is clear that "employer" does include the category of general contractor because Fresquez involved a claim brought by an employee of a subcontractor against the project's general
contractor. Sometimes, too, "the courts draw heavily from landowner-business invitee cases
when discussing virtually any phase of the duty to furnish a safe place to work." Note, The
Duty to Furnisha Safe Place to Work to the Independent Contractorand His Servants, 11
Baylor L. Rev. 170, 171 (1959). What is unclear is whether the holding in Harmon applies to
private persons who are not otherwise employers but who hire an independent contractor who
is not required to carry compensation insurance. See text accompanying note 69 infra for the
argument that this holding ought not apply in such circumstances.
3. Exactly what constitutes a safe place to work is not clear, although the court provides
some guidelines gleaned from Fresquez v. Southwestern Indus. Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 89
N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976). There, the
court stated that equipment is included in the definition of the place the employer must keep
safe, but only equipment that the employer provides. Equipment that is provided by the independent contractor remains the responsibility of the independent contractor. 89 N.M. at 531,
554 P.2d at 992. The Fresquezcourt does not discuss the duration of the duty to provide a safe
place to work. It is therefore an open question whether the duty entails only the turning over of
premises that are safe at the time control passes out of the employer's hands or whether the
employer has a duty to maintain safe premises throughout the duration of the work. For a case
that makes this distinction, see Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d
330, 339 (1965). The court held that the duties outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
see note 43 infra, do not apply to employees of independent contractors. The court emphasized
that:
It must be clearly understood that the rule of nonliability adopted by this court is
limited to the situation where the contractee has turned over safe premises to the
independent contractor without hidden and/or concealed defects and has not retained control of the premises where the work is being performed, either directly
or through other independent contractors. As pointed out in the . . . quotation
from the 7th Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement of Torts [reprinted at
note 43 infra], there is a duty owed to an independent contractor and to his em-
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employees of an independent contractor when the work the contractor was hired to perform is not inherently dangerous.' The court5
concluded that an employer has a duty to provide a safe place to
work for the employees of an independent contractor. 6 The court
further held that this duty can be delegated by the employer to the independent contractor by contractual agreement.' This note discusses
the effect of the decision on the legal rights of injured workers, describes the advantages and disadvantages of alternative solutions to
the problem, and concludes with an analysis of the ramifications of
the decision on the employer-independent contractor relationship.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) contracted with the E.H. Oil Well Servicing Company (E & H),' an independent contractor, to perform
certain tasks related to the completion and development of an
ARCO oil field. 9 The contract was specific with regard to the duties
and responsibilities of the two companies.I Under its terms, E & H
ployees to turn over a reasonably safe place to work, or to give warning of any
dangers.
I Ariz. App. at __
, 403 P.2d at 339-40.
Because the court in Harmon never reached the issue, it is unclear whether ARCO's duty,
absent the contract, was to provide premises safe for any work to be conducted during the
course of E & H's employment, or whether the premises merely had to be generally safe at the
time E & H assumed control. Another formulation of the question might be whether E & H
assumed control of the entire field from the time it first performed work there, or whether control of each portion of the field (or piece of equipment supplied by ARCO) was assumed separately and only when an E & H worker actually performed some task at each location. Another
unanswered question concerns who decided that the frac tank would be used in the manner in
which is was used, see note 14 infra, and whether the decision was made prior or subsequent to
E & H's assumption of control of the premises and method of the work. Questions pertaining
to the duration of the duty to provide a safe place to work and the determination of when control of a specific area of work is assumed may be determinative of future litigation.
4. An employer has no duty to provide a safe place to work for the employees of an independent contractor where the contractor was hired to perform inherently dangerous work. New
Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634 (1976). Inherently dangerous
work is "work likely to be peculiarly dangerous unless special precautions are taken." W.
Prosser, The Law of Torts §71 (1971).
5. Judge Sutin wrote the opinion, with Judge Hernandez and Judge Andrews concurring in
the result.
6. 95 N.M. at 504, 623 P.2dat 1018.
7. 95 N.M. at 505, 623 P.2d at 1019.
8. The court of appeals' opinion, as well as the briefs on both sides, consistently refer to this
company as E & H, and therefore that practice will be followed in this note. However, the
name of the company as it appears on its letterhead is E.H. Oil Well Servicing Company. Record at 27. The Record is available at the University of New Mexico Law Library.
9. The field was located at the Empire Abo Unit H-312. Record at 21 (Affidavit of A.D.
Easley).
10. In pertinent part, the contract provided:
2. When COMPANY [ARCO] notifies CONTRACTOR [E & H] that COMPANY desires certain work to be performed for it by CONTRACTOR, the
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assumed the burden of ensuring that safe practices were followed on
the job site. This responsibility included the duty to inspect the
premises to make sure they were safe. The contract specifically prohibited ARCO from exercising any control over the manner and
method of doing the work, limiting ARCO's supervision to verifying
that the work was proceeding according to contract."
One of the tasks undertaken by E & H was the gauging of a frac
tank which ARCO had leased,' 2 a job that was assigned to E & H's
employee, plaintiff Donald Ray Harmon.' 3 While Harmon was on
performance of such work by CONTRACTOR shall be subject to and in accordance with all of the terms and provisions of this agreement. CONTRA CTOR, before starting work, shall make a thorough inspectionof the work site
to determine the difficulties and hazards incident to the doing of the work.
CONTRACTOR agrees to perform the work with due diligence and in a good
and workmanlike manner. CONTRACTOR shall provide continuous adequate protection of the work, COMPANY's property and adjacentproperty,
and take all necessary precautionsfor the safety of all persons andemployees
on the work, including employees of COMPANY, and comply and cause
CONTRACTOR's employees and agents and others entering on COMPANY's premises in the performance of said work or in connection therewith
to comply with all safety rules of COMPANY and applicable provisions of
federal, state or local safety laws, rules or regulations necessary to prevent
damage or injury to any and all property and persons.
3. COMPANY shall not be obligated to call upon CONTRACTOR for the performance of any work whatsoever. The designation of work to be performed
and the cessation of work shall be at the discretion of COMPANY, that the
work herein provided for shall be done and performed by CONTRACTOR
as an independent contractor and under the sole supervision, management,
direction and control of CONTRACTOR. COMPANY shall look to CONTRACTOR for results only, and shall have no right at any time to direct or
supervise CONTRACTOR or CONTRACTOR's servants or employees in
the performance of said work or as to the manner, means and methods by
which work or labor is performed. CONTRACTOR agrees that any and all
work done by CONTRACTOR pursuant to this agreement shall meet with
the approval of COMPANY's engineers or inspectors, and that the work in
process or any job shall be open to inspection by COMPANY at all times, but
that the mannerand method of doing such work shall be under the sole control of CONTRACTOR.
4. COMPANY may, without any liability to CONTRACTOR, countermand
any work order given to CONTRACTOR at any time before such work is
commenced by CONTRACTOR, or may order the cessation of such work at
any time, being liable to CONTRACTOR in the latter case only for the value
of the work performed prior to cessation order, at the rates above set forth.
95 N.M. at 505,623 P.2d at 1019.
11. 95 N.M. at 506, 623 P.2d at 1020.
12. Record at 55 (Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment). See 95 N.M. at 506, 623 P.2d at 1020. But see 95 N.M. at 502, 623 P.2d at 1016 for
the court's assertion that ARCO owned the tank.
13. A frac tank holds liquid, usually water, which is pumped into the ground to open fractures underground to allow gas and oil to flow freely. The amount of liquid left in the tank is
periodically measured to determine how much water has been pumped into the ground. This
measurement is called "gauging." When a frac tank is used in this manner, which is its normal
use, the contents of the tank are known because the liquid has been added by workers. When a
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the tank, he inhaled escaping hydrogen sulfide gas, fell from the
tank and was injured.'" He filed a workmen's compensation' 5 claim
against E & H and received compensation benefits. '6
Harmon filed suit against ARCO alleging that ARCO had been
17
negligent in failing to provide him with a safe place to work.
ARCO denied Harmon's allegations'" and moved for summary
judgment.' 9 The trial court granted ARCO's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that ARCO was not liable to Harmon as a
well is newly drilled, however, a frac tank is sometimes used temporarily as an oil storage tank
in order to see if the well is producing. In these circumstances, oil from the ground mixed with
water and gas is pumped into the tank, and the content then measured. This procedure presents
a more dangerous situation. When oil is pumped into a permanent storage tank, a separator is
attached to the line to remove the water and gas from the oil which is pumped into the tank.
When a frac tank is used as a temporary measure, a separator is not attached. It therefore appears that the process may be inherently dangerous when a frac tank is used instead of a proper
oil storage tank because injury is to be expected unless proper precautions (attaching a separator) are taken. Of course, Harmon would not plead that the work was inherently dangerous because his case would then be controlled by New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M.
278, 551 P.2d 634 (1976), which had already decided that an employer has no duty to provide a
safe place to work for the employees of an independent contractor where the work the independent contractor was hired to do is inherently dangerous.
Technical information regarding the working of a frac tank was kindly provided by Mr. Bill
Gressett of the State Oil Conservation Division.
14. Harmon was an experienced oil field worker, having spent more than six years on and
around frac tanks. By his own admission, he was aware that gas was leaking from the frac tank
at a rapid rate, and that such gas was hazardous and should be avoided. Nevertheless, he
climbed the ladder to the tank in order to gauge it. He was careful to see that the wind was
blowing in a direction which would carry the gas away from him. While he was on the tank,
there was a sudden change in the direction of the wind, which blew the rapidly escaping gas at
him. Harmon inhaled the gas and fell from the tank, breaking his neck. Record at 39-40
(Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).
15. In New Mexico, the act governing workplace accidents is still named the Workmen's
Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§52-1-1 to 52-3-9 (Supp. 1980). In other jurisdictions,
the name of the corresponding act has been changed to Worker's Compensation Act to reflect
the trend away from sex-based terminology. See Cal. Labor Code §3200 (West 1979); N.Y.
Worker's Compensation Law § I (McKinnley 1978). Because the name of the act has not yet
been changed in New Mexico, this note will refer to the benefits conferred by that act as workmen's compensation benefits, even though the term should be replaced by a gender-neutral
designation.
16. 95 N.M. at 506, 623 P.2d at 1020.
17. Record at I (Complaint).
18. Record at 7 (Answer). ARCO also alleged as affirmative defenses that (i) the accident
was a result of an Act of God (Count 1)and that (2) Harmon was contributorily negligent
(Count IV). At the time this suit was filed, March 2, 1979, New Mexico followed the rule of
contributory negligence, which would have precluded recovery as a matter of law if Harmon
had been shown to have been contributorily negligent in his performance of the work. New
Mexico has since adopted the rule of comparative negligence, which would apportion damages
in accordance with the proportion of fault between the parties. Claymore v. City of Albuquerque, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 75 (Jan. 15, 1981) (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Scott v. Rizzo, 20
N.M. St. B. Bull. 289 (March 12, 1981). The issue of contributory negligence, however, was
not reached in Harmon since the court found that ARCO was not liable.
19. This motion was based on the depositions of Harmon and Gerald Strange, ARCO's
drilling superintendent, the pleadings and other papers filed of record, and an affidavit submitted by ARCO which had attached to it the contract between ARCO and E & H. Record at 15
(Motion for Summary Judgment).
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matter of law because, under the contract, E & H was responsible for
the safety of all persons on the job site. The trial court further found
that ARCO had not exercised any control over E & H's operations,
and that Harmon was employed by E & H and was acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 2 °
Harmon's appeal stressed (1) that material issues of fact existed as
to whether ARCO should reasonably have foreseen the danger to
Harmon and provided a safer frac tank; (2) that the contract between ARCO and E & H was subject to different interpretations;
and (3) that ARCO had not fulfilled its duty to warn Harmon of the
presence of hydrogen sulfide gas in the oil field.2"
The court of appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. 2 The
specific issue addressed by the court was whether, as a matter of law,
ARCO had a duty to provide Harmon, an employee of an independent contractor, with a safe place to work. 3 Noting that this issue
was one of first impression in New Mexico, the court recognized that
its determination would be based on "judicial public policy."" The
court found that an analysis of public policy required a balancing of
the employer's right to contract for nonliability with the employer's
duty to provide a safe place to work. "5 The court held that an employer has a duty to provide a safe place to work for the employees
of an independent contractor hired to perform work which is not inherently dangerous.1 6 The court further held, however, that the employer is relieved of that duty if the contract between the employer
and the independent contractor places the responsibility for safety
on the independent contractor, and if the employer exercises no control over the manner, method or means by which the work is to be
accomplished. 27 Thus, in the space of one holding, the court created
a previously unrecognized duty of an employer to the employee of an
independent contractor, and then provided the employer with the
means of avoiding that duty.
HISTORICAL BASES OF THE OPINION
The Harmon decision springs from two tort doctrines which have
become inextricably connected in the employer-independent con20. 95 N.M. at 503, 623 P.2d at 1017.
21. Harmon also asserted that summary judgment was improper because material issues of
fact existed as to whether ARCO did in fact exercise control over the job site and as to whether
Harmon was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Appellant's Brief in Chief at i.
22. 95 N.M. at 502, 623 P.2d at 1016.
23. Id.
24. 95 N.M. at 505, 623 P.2d at 1019.
25. Id.
26. 95 N.M. at 504, 623 P.2d at 1018.
27. 95 N.M. at 505, 623 P.2d at 1019.
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tractor case law. 28 These are (1) the duty of a landowner to maintain
safe premises for business invitees, and (2) the liability of an employer for the negligence of an independent contractor. Although
each doctrine has a separate existence of its own, in the case law they
often merge and join with other issues in a confusing fashion.
At common law, a landowner has a duty to maintain premises
which are reasonably safe for business invitees who come upon the
property.2 9 The scope of this duty, which includes an obligation to
warn invitees of hidden danger of which the owner is aware,3" extends to independent contractors and their employees. 3 ' The owner
is not, however, an insurer of the safety of business invitees or of
employees; the rule is that the owner must "exercise ordinary care to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition so that the employee will not be injured." 32 The safety duties of the landowner are
transferred to a general contractor when control of the premises is
transferred to the contractor. Thus, only an employer who has control of the premises or the manner of the work is held liable
for the
33
landowner's duties with respect to the safety of employees.
The broad common law duties of the landowner have been narrowed by numerous exceptions. 34 For example, an owner, and thus
3
an employer, owes no duty to warn of obvious dangers on the land.
The owner or employer is also not liable for injuries resulting from
28. Although an analysis of the distinction between an independent contractor and a servant
is beyond the scope of this note, it should be recognized that the categories are by no means
sharply defined. See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev.
501 (1935); Note, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisalof the Independent
ContractorRule, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661 (1973).
29. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).
30. Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1966).
31. Casperson v. La Sala Bros., 253 N.Y. 491, 171 N.E. 754 (1930) (per Cardozo).
32. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753, 755 (5th Cir. 1960).
33. In New Mexico, these principles have been set forth in a series of cases dating from the
1960's. In Padilla v. Winsor, 67 N.M. 267, 354 P.2d 740 (1960), the supreme court held that an
employer has a duty to provide his employees a reasonably safe place to work and safe equipment. In a specially concurring opinion in Srader v. Pecos Constr. Co., 71 N.M. 320, 378 P.2d
364 (1963), Justice Moise stated that the duty would extend to a general contractor with respect
to the employee of a subcontractor on the theory that the employee of the subcontractor was a
business invitee of the general contractor. 71 N.M. at 326, 378 P.2d at 369. Finally, the court
held in DeArman v. Popps, 75 N.M. 39, 400 P.2d 215 (1965), that an employer who directly
supervises the manner of work of an employee of an independent contractor will be held liable
for injury to that employee arising from work performed under the employer's control if the
employer should have reasonably foreseen the danger.
34. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§340-343 (1965).
35. Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 (1963). "An owner of
land who delivers temporary possession of a portion of the land to an independent contractor
owes no duty to the employees of the independent contractor with respect to an obviously
dangerous condition on that portion of the land in the possession of the contractor . . . [citations omitted]." 410 Pa. at __
, 189 A.2d at 277.
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known hazards which are incidental to the work the employee was
hired to perform. 6 In addition, in many jurisdictions,37 an employer
is not liable to the employees of an independent contractor for an injury arising from work which is inherently dangerous. In New Mexico, the rule relating to inherently dangerous work was adopted by
the supreme court in New Mexico Electric Service Co. v.
Montanez. 11 Montanez was an employee of an independent electrical
contractor who had been hired to dismantle a secondary electrical
system at an oil well. 39 Because the primary system was not dead,
Montanez was injured when he came in contact with a live wire."0 He
sued the oil well company for breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care. 4 The court held that the employer of an independent contractor is under no duty to provide a safe place to work for the
employees of the independent contractor where the work the independent contractor is hired to perform is inherently dangerous."
36. Wolczak v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 168 A.2d 412 (1961).
The duty to provide a reasonably safe place in which to work is relative to the
nature of the invited endeavor and does not entail the elimination of potential
operational hazards which are obvious and visible to the invitee upon ordinary
observation. [Citations omitted.] This is especially so when the invitee is an experienced laborer hired either to correct the very danger present or to perform his
tasks amidst the visible hazards. The landowner may assume that the worker, or
his superiors, are possessed of sufficient skill to recognize the degree of danger
involved and to adjust their methods of work accordingly. Thus the unimpaired
line of holdings to the effect that the duty to provide a reasonably safe working
place for employees of an independent contractor does not relate to known
hazards which are part of or incidental to the very work the contractor was hired
to perform. [Citations omitted.]
, 168 A.2d at 417.
66 N.J. Super. at __
37. See, e.g., King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1973); Welker
v. Kennecott Copper Co., I Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 (1965); Epperly v. City of Seattle, 63
Wash. 2d 777, 399 P.2d 591 (1965); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla.
1964); Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 (1963); Potter v. City of
Kenosah, 268 Wis. 361, 68 N.W.2d 4 (1955); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d 970
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943). For cases contra, see Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.
Tenn. 1955); Smith v. Inter-County Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d (Mo. 1977); Vannoy v. City of Warren, 15 Mich. App. 158, 166 N.W.2d 486 (1968); McDonald v. City of Oakland, 255 Cal. App.
2d 816, 63 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967).
38. 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634 (1976).
39. 89N.M. at 279, 551 P.2dat 635.
40. Id.
41. 89 N.M. at 281,551 P.2d at 637.
42. The opinion was based on sections 413, 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965). These sections read:
§413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in
Work Entrusted to Contractor
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable
risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to
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The second important doctrine is the general rule, subject to exceptions, that an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.4 The exceptions to the rule arise in those
liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if
the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions; or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the
taking of such precautions.
§416. Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical
harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for
such precautions in the contract or otherwise.
§427. Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate
when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such
danger.
The court interpreted the words "to others" in these sections to refer only to third-party
strangers and excluded employees of independent contractors from the protection afforded by
these provisions. In so holding, the court was persuaded by the reasoning set forth in a special
note to Chapter 15 in Tentative Draft No. 7 (1962) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One reason why such responsibility has not developed has been that the
workman's recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions, regulated by
workmen's compensation acts, the theory of which is that the insurance out of
which the compensation is to be paid is to be carried by the workman's own
employer, and of course premiums are to be calculated on that basis. While
workmen's compensation acts not infrequently provide for third-party liability,
it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such liability upon one who hires
the contractor, since it is to be expected that the cost of the workmen's compensation insurance will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the
work, and so will in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires
him.
Interestingly, this language was not included in the final draft of the Restatement and the
reason for its omission is unclear.
That the Special Note was not finally included in the Second Restatement has,
however, been considered by some as conclusive that the employees of an independent contractor may'recover. . . . We disagree. It is just as likely that the
American Law Institute was unable to agree, and left the issue purposely
unclear. [Citations omitted.]
Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 P.2d 157, 160 (Alaska 1976).
43. The court in New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634
(1976), approved the reasoning set forth in King v. Shelby Elec. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.
1974):
I. The principal reason for the development of the doctrine of liability of an
employer of an independent contractor engaged in inherently dangerous work is
to prevent the employer from escaping liability to others or shifting that liability
to an independent contractor. In the case of industrial accidents, the vast major-
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situations where the employer retains control of the premises or of
the manner in which the work is to be performed." This position was
adopted in New Mexico in Fresquez v. Southwestern Industrial Contractors & Riggers, Inc. ", This case concerned a laborer employed by
a subcontractor hired to drill and set pilings for the foundation of a
school."' The laborer was killed when a piece of torque arm from a
rented crane broke and fell on him during the course of his employment. 4 7 The administratrix of his estate alleged that the general contractor had been negligent in failing to provide Fresquez with a safe
place to work.4 8 The court assumed, but did not decide, that a general contractor has a duty to provide a safe place to work for the
employees of an independent contractor and focused its opinion on
the circumstances in which such a duty arises.4 9 The court concluded
that if the general contractor maintains control over the premises on
which the work is to be done or over the manner in which the work is
to be performed, the general contractor may be held liable for injuries to employees of the subcontractor resulting from an unsafe
work place or unsafe work conditions.5" The unsafe equipment in
Fresquez was leased, however, and therefore the general contractor
was not liable because it owed no duty of care with respect to equipment furnished by an independent contractor. 5 ' The general contractor was not liable on a theory of control of the work either, because
the only control it exercised was that of general supervision necessary to ascertain that the subcontractor was performing the work in
accordance with his contract. This generalized right to oversee the
ity are covered by Workmen's Compensation laws and to that extent the
employer of the independent contractor does not escape or shift liability since the
employer, in effect, pays the premiums for Workmen's Compensation coverage.
2. There does not seem to be any valid reason why an employer of an independent contractor for the performance of specific work should be subjected to a
greater liability than he would have had if he had utilized his own employees on
that particular work.
502 S.W.2d at 662-63. The reasoning given to support the position, however, is not limited
necessarily to inherently dangerous work. Because workmen's compensation covers safe as
well as dangerous work, the rationale that the employer no longer escapes liability since the
contract price contains the compensation premium amount is also true for work which is not
dangerous. For a discussion of the "pseudodistinction" between work inherently dangerous
and work dangerous only if performed in a negligent manner, see Welker v. Kennecott Copper
-,
403 P.2d 330, 339 (1965).
Co., 1Ariz. App. 395,
44. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts §71 (1971).
45. 89 N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976).
46. Id. at 525, 554 P.2d at 986.
47. Id. at 530, 554 P.2d at 991.
48. Id. at 527, 554 P.2d at 988.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 530, 554 P.2d at 991.
51. 89 N.M. at 529, 554 P.2d at 900.
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project does not render the general contractor liable for injury to the
employees of the subcontractor where the subcontractor's negligence
created a dangerous work situation.52
Thus, in its broadest terms, the question left unanswered by Montanez and Fresquez was whether an employer who hires an independent contractor to perform work not inherently dangerous on
premises owned or controlled by the employer will be liable if an employee of the independent contractor is injured due to the failure of
the employer to provide a safe place to work. The question was
presented in Harmon and answered in the affirmative, with the
qualification that the liability of the employer may be avoided by a
contract which delegates the responsibility for safety to the independent contractor.
DISCUSSION
In light of previous New Mexico case law and the underlying tort
principles involved in employer-independent contractor cases, there
are at least four possible positions among which the court can choose
with regard to whether an employer has a duty to provide a safe
place to work for the employees of an independent contractor. The
court could rule that:
(1) there is no duty;53
(2) there is a duty and it is non-delegable;
(3) there is a duty but it can be contracted away;
(4) there is a duty but the liability of the employer is limited whenever the employee is covered by workmen's compensation insurance.
Each of these positions presents its own set of advantages and dis52. 89N.M. at 530, 554 P.2d at 991.
53. Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408 (Utah 1915), provides one explanation of why an employer
should not be held responsible for injury to the employee of an independent contractor where
the employer exercises no control over the method of the work:
But it is said developing a tunnel by underground blasting is dangerous. Dangerous to whom? Here, only to those engaged in and about the work. So is feeding a
threshing machine or working at sawmilling dangerous. An inexperienced
employ6, unguarded against attendant dangers and attempting such work, may
probably be injured. Who, if any one, owes him duties of warning and protecdon? He who employed or directed or controlled him, or directed or controlled
the threshing or sawmilling. Certainly not the farmer, who did no more than
merely contract with the thresher to thresh his grain, or with the sawmiller to saw
his timber . . . [citation omitted]. We think, therefore, that the case comes
within the'general rule that when a person employs a contractor to do work
lawful in ,itself and involving no injurious consequences to others, and damage
arises to another through the negligence of the contractor or his servants, the
contractor, and not the general employer, is liable.
143 P. at 412.
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advantages; none is a perfect holding that solves all problems in all
circumstances. Ultimately, then, the court's decision rests on a value
judgment as to which interests are the most important to uphold and
which social policies should be fostered.
The court, of course, does not act in a vacuum. Some social policy
choices have already been made by the legislature, notably the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act.54 The purpose of the
compensation laws is to provide a secure cash recovery for injured
workers and to pass the cost of the injury on to the consumers of the
product which the worker was engaged in producing at the time of
the accident. 5 The compensation system is not fault-based, as is a
tort system.5 6 Rather, legislatures have seen fit to provide a secured
recovery in the form of insurance benefits awarded without a showing of negligence. The cost of insurance premiums is added into the
cost of the product and thus is borne by the consumer." The goal of
the system is not to make the worker whole, as in a tort sytem, but
merely to provide a recovery which will enable the worker to live
without being a burden to others. 58 It is a social welfare system arising from the belief that those who are injured in the course of gainful
employment should not be allowed to starve, and from the economic
judgment that consumers are in the best position to bear the risk of
industrial accidents. 9 Each of the suggested positions must be considered in light of the established policies of the compensation act to
which they are intimately related.
The first solution, that there is no duty, must be analyzed with
regard to the four possible fact patterns it encompasses:
a. the employer carries compensation insurance, but the independent contractor does not;
b. both the employer and the independent contractor carry compensation insurance;
c. the employer does not carry compensation insurance, but the
independent contractor does;
d. neither the employer nor the independent contractor carries
compensation insurance.
If the employer owes no duty to provide a safe place to work for
the employees of an independent contractor, two of the above situations result in financial disaster for the employee of the independent
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-1-1 to 53-3-9 (Supp. 1980).
A. Larson, The Law of Workman's Compensation § 1(1978).
Id. §2.10.
Id. §1.
Id.§ 2.5.
Id.§§ 1-2.
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contractor who is injured on the job due to the negligence of the
employer. Where the independent contractor does not carry compensation insurance, as in fact patterns (a) and (d), there will be no
way to reimburse the injured worker for medical expenses and lost
wages. Recovery through a negligence suit against the employer is
barred once the courts declare no duty, and therefore no liability, on
the part of the employer. Recovery in tort against the independent
contractor is unavailable if the negligence which caused the accident
is attributable to the employer.
In the remaining two examples, (b) and (c), where the independent
contractor does carry compensation insurance, a holding that the
employer owes no duty to the employee of the independent contractor will limit the injured employee's recovery to benefits provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 60 The employee will be precluded from suing the employer in tort, but the insurance benefits
will serve the purpose of affording at least minimal relief from
financial hardship.
The second choice, recognizing a non-delegable duty,6 ' prevents
the attenuation of the duty through the creation of exceptions which
obliterate the rule. The disadvantage to this solution is that it
penalizes the employer for hiring an independent contractor. This
penalty is most clearly seen in cases where the employer could use
direct employees to do the work. In that case, the direct employee
who was injured could recover only through workmen's compensation. Courts have been reluctant to "penalize the legal-industrial
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-6(D) (Supp. 1980) reads:
Such compliance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, including the provisions for insurance, shall be, and construed to be, a surrender
by the employer and the employee of their rights to any other method, form or
amount of compensation or determination thereof, or to any cause of action at
law, suit in equity or statutory or common-law right to remedy or proceeding
whatever for or on account of such personal injuries or death of such employee
than as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act, and shall be an acceptance of all of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and shall
bind the employee himself, and for compensation for his death, shall bind his
personal representative, his surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the
employer, and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency.
Nothing in the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, shall affect, or be construed to affect, in any way, the existence of, or the mode of trial of, any claim
or cause of action which the workman has against any person other than his
employer, or another employee of his employer, including a management or
supervisory employee, or the insurer, guarantor or surety of his employer.
61. In holding this duty to be non-delegable, the Court of Appeals of Michigan stated: "A
distinction, as argued by the City, based upon the legal designation of the injured parties, e.g.
'third' persons or 'others' as opposed to employees of independent contractors, violates the abVannoy v. City of Warren, 166 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Mich.
solute character of the duty.
Ct. App. 1968).

Winter 19821

HARMON V. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO.

tool of the contract with an independent contractor, so as to increase
6' 2
the liability of the builder simply because this device is used. "
Moreover, even where the employer does not have direct employees,
imposing a non-delegable duty results in a double cost to the employer. The contract price of the work the independent contractor is
hired to perform presumably includes the cost of compensation insurance which the contractor must obtain.6 3 Thus the employer pays
for the insurance which the independent contractor purchases. To
allow a negligence suit against the employer who has already paid
for workmen's compensation coverage provides a windfall for the
injured employee who is fortunate enough to be employed by an independent contractor. 6"
The third choice, and the one selected by the Harmon court,
makes the worker's right to sue for torts contingent upon the provisions of a contract. The court held that an employer has a duty to
provide a safe place to work for the employee of an independent
contractor, but that the duty can be delegated by contract between
the employer and the independent contractor. If this contract were
negotiated between the employer and the employee, the concept of
freedom of contract might be invoked as a rationale for this position. Here, however, the contract which eliminated the worker's
right to sue in tort was between the employer and the independent
contractor. The worker who was affected by the contract was not a
party to the contract. He probably had no influence on its terms, and
he may not even have known of the provision that eliminated his
common law right to sue in negligence and gave him nothing in return.
The benefit of this position is that it treats the employee of the independent contractor as if that employee were hired by ARCO. That
is, the employee of the independent contractor can recover no more
than ARCO's own employee could recover, and thus ARCO is not
subjected to a greater liability for this injury than would have been
possible had the employee been ARCO's own servant. This result is,

62. Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., I Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330, 339 (1965).
63. Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 15 special note (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962), quoted
note 43 supra.
64. In New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634 (1976), the
court stated that there was no reason for the employer to become an insurer of the employees
of an independent contractor. 89 N.M. at 282, 551 P.2d at 638. Because the New Mexico
Workmen's Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§52-1-1 to 52-1-69 (1978), does not require
negligence to be shown in order for the worker to recover, the employer is an insurer of the
direct employee. For a decision based on a statute which does require a showing of negligence,
see Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
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however, achieved at the cost of imposing on the worker a contract
for which he did not bargain.
An alternative way to achieve the same result would have been to
uphold the indemnity provision of the contract. 5 ARCO and E & H
had agreed that E & H would indemnify ARCO for any award for
damages arising out of the work. This provision, which bound only
ARCO and E & H, would have allowed Harmon to recover from
ARCO, and ARCO to be reimbursed for its outlay by E & H. This
course was not open to the court, however, because in New Mexico
indemnity provisions are void as contrary to public policy and are
unenforceable when they pertain to "any well for oil."" The only
65. Paragraph 8 of the contract between ARCO and E & H reads in pertinent part:
CONTRACTOR agrees to hold harmless and unconditionally indemnify COMPANY against and for all liability, cost, expenses, claims and damages which
COMPANY may at any time suffer or sustain or become liable for by reason of
any accidents, damages or injuries either to the persons or property or both, of
CONTRACTOR, or of the workmen of either party, or of any other parties, or
to the property of COMPANY, in any manner arising from the work performed
hereunder, including but not limited to any negligent act or omission of
COMPANY, its officers, agents, or employees.
Record at 25-26. For authority that the policy considerations expressed in the N.M. Workmen's Compensation Act do not bar enforcement of a contractual indemnity agreement, see
City of Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1980).
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. §56-7-2(A) (1978) provides:
Any agreement, covenant or promise contained in, collateral to or affecting
any agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any
mineral, which purports to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for
damages, for:
(1)death or bodily injury to persons; or
(2) injury to property; or
(3) any other loss, damage or expense arising under either Paragraph (1)or (2)
or both; or
(4) any combination of these, arising from the sole or concurrent negligence
of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee, or from any accident which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision of the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the indemnitee or in
accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee or employees or
representatives of the indemnitee, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract
or any benefit conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act [52-1-1 to 52-1-69
NMSA 1978].
For a general discussion of the policy reasons for not enforcing an indemnification clause,
see Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966), in which the argument is made
that it is unconscionable to impose full liability for a construction project on a company which
undertakes only a small portion of the total work. This argument was rejected because: "The
general rule . . . seems to be that while private contracts of this type are not favorites of the
law, they are enforceable provided they are made at arm's length without disparity of bargaining power, and the intent of the parties is manifestly plain and unequivocal." 365 F.2d at 548.
For an interesting contrasting view of idemnity agreements, see Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), in which the United States Supreme Court
held that, under admiralty law, the stevedoring company's agreement to perform stevedoring
operations "necessarily includes . . . [the] obligation not only to stow the pulp rolls, but to
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means of giving effect to the freedom of contract theory was to enforce the provisions of the contract which placed the burden for
safety matters on E & H.
There are three major drawbacks to this position. One is that the
worker is bound by a contract to which he is not a party. The second
is that the court has allowed ARCO to circumvent the statute which
prohibits indemnity agreements pertaining to injuries arising from
the development of oil wells. Although in this case E & H does not
have to reimburse ARCO for any damage award and thereby relieve
ARCO of the financial burden of a judgment, ARCO remains insulated from the consequences of the injury by a holding which allows
the duty to be delegated to E & H. From ARCO's viewpoint, the result is the same as if the void indemnity provision had been upheld.
The final disadvantage of this position is that it opens the door to
discrepant recovery possibilities. If two workers are injured in the
same accident but are employed by different independent contractors, their right to sue in negligence will depend upon the terms of
the contract between the employer and the independent contractors.
In cases where the allocation of risk to the independent contractor is
a result of the relative bargaining strength of the parties, a small contractor in need of work will be forced to accept that burden as a condition of obtaining employment, but a larger, more financially secure contractor may refuse the responsibility for safety and still be
awarded the job. The employee of the small independent contractor
will be limited to a workmen's compensation recovery, while the employee of a more solvent independent contractor will possibly recover a large award in a negligence suit against the employer. Another situation in which injured employees will not recover equally
arises when one worker is the employee of the independent contractor but the other is the employee of the employer. Absent a contract
provision to the contrary, the former may sue in negligence but the
latter will receive only compensation benefits. The injustice of permitting widely divergent recoveries in cases where two workers suffer the same injury in the same accident is compounded by the fact
that this possibility arises from a contract negotiated in the absence
of the workers.
The fourth possibility, that the employer's duty to provide a safe
place to work for the employees of an independent contractor is fulfilled whenever the employer is covered by workmen's compensation
stow them properly and safely." The court therefore held that the stevedoring company was,
merely by entering into a contract to perform stevedoring services, thereby under a duty to indemnify the shipowner for losses resulting from any negligent stowage.
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insurance, would ensure that all who are injured in work-related accidents would recover through the sole remedy of workmen's compensation if that were available. This position is subject to two interpretations. Under the first, the employer would be required to
reimburse the compensation carrier of the independent contractor
for the amount of compensation benefits paid to the injured employee of the independent contractor where the injury resulted from
the employer's negligence. The appeal of this solution is that liability
for providing a safe place to work is placed on the employer for
whom the work is being done and who is generally in the best position to maintain the premises. Also, this position would encourage
employers to provide safe premises because there would be a financial penalty imposed in cases where the negligence of the employer
led to injury of the employee of the independent contractor. The
disadvantages of this position are (1) the employer again assumes a
double burden, i.e., the payment of the compensation insurance
premiums which were included in the contract price negotiated with
the independent contractor and the reimbursement to the insurance
carrier for benefits actually paid to the worker; (2) the employer
relieves the insurance company of its contractual obligation to
assume the risk for the loss.
The second interpretation of this position would limit the recovery
of the employee of an independent contractor to workmen's compensation benefits exclusively in all cases where the employee was injured as a result of the employer's negligent failure to provide a safe
work place, but would not require the employer to reimburse the
compensation carrier. The basis for this position is the relationship
between the employer and the employee of the independent contractor, a relationship that exists through the vertical privity of contract
which links the two through the intermediary of the independent
contractor. All workers at the site are there to do work specified by
the employer and for the benefit of the employer. In a real sense, the
employee of the independent contractor is essentially hired by the
employer, and the existence of the intermediary who selects the employee is irrelevant to the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. 67 Once the issue of fault has been expressly eliminated from the
compensation system, there seems to be no good reason why compensation benefits should be the exclusive remedy for direct employees only. When breach of a duty as the basis for recovery has been
67. The distinction between servant and independent contractor is so fine that both relationships might exist "at the same time in connection with different phases of the work." Corban
v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1958).
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replaced by work-relatedness as the criterion, it is appropriate that
all persons injured while performing tasks necessary to accomplish
the employer's goal should be included in the scope of the recovery
system.
Under this solution, all workers would receive compensation benefits for work-related injuries if compensation insurance has been
purchased whether by the employer or by the independent contractor. If neither the employer nor the independent contractor has provided insurance coverage,68 the worker would retain the right to sue
the negligent party in tort. Therefore, no worker is left without a
remedy.
This suggestion does not mean that all injuries which occur at the
workplace would be limited to compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but only that the employee of an independent
contractor would be treated the same as the servant of the employer
with respect to work-related injuries. Both would retain their right to
sue for intentional torts and to sue third parties in negligence. The
employer, however, would be recognized as the employer of all the
workers assembled on the premises to do the ordered work.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Harmon means that, in the absence of a contract
to the contrary, a duty to provide a safe place to work for the
employees of an independent contractor will be imposed on the
employer who has control of the premises. This duty is fulfilled with
regard to the employer's own employees by the payment of workmen's compensation premiums, thereby limiting recovery to compensation benefits. Thus, absent specific contract provisions allocating the duty to the independent contractor, the employer's duty is
fulfilled in a manner which protects the employer from the risk of a
large award in a negligence suit brought by an employee, but does
not protect the employer from a negligence suit brought by the employee of an independent contractor. The employer may, however,
by contract, place the responsibility for safety solely on the independent contractor. If the employer exercises no control over the manner and method of the work, the contract will absolve the employer
of all liability for injury arising from the work. With this holding,
the court of appeals has approved a subterfuge. A contract which
68. This situation is most likely to arise when neither the employer nor the independent contractor employs more than four employees and is therefore exempt from the Workmen's Compensation Act provisions. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-2 (1978) (formerly §59-10-2 (1953)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

allocates the duty of safety to the independent contractor eliminates
the employer's liability to the employees of the independent contractor, who, by law, are limited to workmen's compensation as their exclusive remedy against their direct employer. The very class of persons the court was attempting to protect by holding that an employer
had a duty to provide a safe place to work for the employees of an
independent contractor is thereby excluded from the protection afforded by the holding. Functionally, the Harmon decision amounts
to a holding that an employer owes no duty to the employee of an independent contractor, for other employers have copied the contract
between ARCO and E & H.69 Instead of making the amount of protection afforded to a worker vary with the provisions of the contract
between the independent contractor and the employer, a more consistent result could have been reached by a holding that all workers
injured due to unsafe premises or practices are limited to workmen's
compensation benefits where the insurance premiums have been paid
either directly or indirectly by the employer.
NANCY AUGUSTUS HERTZ

69. ARCO's attorney reports that he has received several requests for copies of the ARCOE & H contract since this case was decided. Private conversation with Briggs Cheney of Shaffer, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C. (Sept. 1981).

